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Consolidation causes little austerity. 
 
Abstract. 
There is a widespread view that reducing national debts 
and deficits, or “consolidating” them, causes austerity or 
would hinder the recovery. The reality is that reducing 
structural debts and deficits and “stimulus debts” is 
easily done without any significant deflationary effects. 
In contrast, stimulus deficits cannot be reduced in that 
they are required to deal with recessions, thought they 
can perfectly well accumulate as extra monetary base 
rather than as extra debt.  
Money for the above debt and deficit reduction can be 
obtained from raised taxes and/or public spending cuts, 
while making good the deflationary effect of the latter 
with quantitative easing. As long as the deflationary 
effect of the former equals the stimulatory effect of the 
latter, there is little net effect on GDP, aggregate 
employment and so on. Meanwhile debts or deficits are 
reduced. 
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There is a widespread view that reducing national debts 
and deficits, or “consolidating” them, causes austerity or 
would hinder the recovery. This view often takes the 
form of claims to the effect that deficits and debts must 
be reduced, but not before the recovery takes hold. Most 
readers will probably have seen innumerable examples 
of this sort of claim. But for the benefit those who have 
not, a few examples are: OECD (2010), Rivlin (2010:3), 
Harding (2011) or Ostry (2010A&B). 
Some readers may be puzzled by the fact that three out 
of the above five works come from two reputable 
international organisations: the IMF and OECD. 
However this paper is nowhere near the first to suggest 
that these two organisations have a less than full grasp 
of debts and deficits, to put it politely. Prof. William 
Mitchell, for example, has been a constant critic of these 
two organisations (e.g. Mitchell (2011)). 
The conventional “consolidation causes austerity” 
argument is usually to the effect that taxes must be 
collected (and/or public spending cut) in order to obtain 
the money with which to repay debts or reduce deficits.  
And tax increases or public spending cuts are 
deflationary, therefor, so the argument goes, 
consolidation is deflationary. The purpose of this paper 
is to show that the latter argument is badly flawed: that 
is, consolidation and a country’s stance on the “stimulus 
– deflation” scale are essentially independent of each 
other. 
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Various simplifying assumptions are made below, as 
follows. 
1. The argument below is concerned only with countries 
which issue their own currencies. That is, while the 
arguments apply to the Eurozone as a whole, individual 
countries that are part of a common currency system, 
like the Eurozone, are not considered here. 
2. Governments and central banks are considered as a 
single unit below, and are referred to simply as 
“government”.    
3. The argument starts with the “closed economy” 
assumption. Open economies, that is economies which 
trade with the rest of the world, are considered towards 
the end. 
 
Structural and stimulus debt. 
A distinction is made below between debt arising for 
structural reasons and for stimulus reasons. Structural 
debt is taken here to mean debt which arises purely 
through failure to collect enough tax to fund government 
spending: there being no intention to impart stimulus. In 
practice this usage of the word “structural” amounts to 
the same as the definition given, for example, in the 
Reuters Financial Glossary definition, which is “The 
portion of a country's budget deficit that is not the result 
of changes in the economic cycle. The structural deficit 
4 
 
 
will exist even when the economy is at the peak of the 
cycle.” 
This distinction between structural and stimulus debt is 
not in practice very important. The distinction is only 
made here so as to clarify the theory.   
  
Structural debt. 
The idea that structural deficits or debts cannot be 
reduced without deflationary consequences is on the 
face of it bizarre because as mentioned above, 
structural deficits and debts do not arise out of any 
intention to impart stimulus. Thus the removal of 
structural deficits and debts will not, by definition, have 
any “anti-stimulatory” effect. 
This raises the question as to why there is a widespread 
belief that removal of structural deficits or debts will be 
deflationary. The answer is that those who make the 
latter claim make a simple mistake, which will now be 
explained. 
Let us consider a government which raises spending by 
$X a year and fails to collect tax to cover this 
expenditure, and which has to borrow in consequence. 
The effects of consolidating the debt a few years later 
will then be considered.  
The above failure to collect enough tax has a stimulatory 
or inflationary effect which must be countered by some 
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sort of deflationary instrument, for example borrowing, 
assuming aggregate demand is to remain constant.  
Where government goes for the borrow option, the 
deflationary effect, is unlikely to be sufficient if 
government simply borrows $X. Reasons are as follows. 
The latter “borrow and spend” scenario involves having 
government take $X from the private sector, give the 
private sector $X of bonds in return and spend the $X 
back into the private sector. The net result is that the 
private sector is $X up (in the form of $X worth of 
bonds). 
That is different from extracting $X per year of tax from 
the private sector and spending the money. In the latter 
case, the private sector is no better off: at least the 
private sectors’ net financial assets (PSNFA) do not rise. 
Thus under the borrow option, government will need to 
take some further deflationary measure. This additional 
deflationary measure could be to raise interest rates, or 
it could be to borrow an additional amount over and 
above the $X and doing nothing with the money 
concerned. Effectively, the “additional amount” is 
extinguished or “unprinted”.  
Indeed, raising interest rates and borrowing the above 
“additional amount” come to much the same thing, since 
governments force through interest rate increases by 
borrowing, i.e. selling bonds.  So let us assume that 
given a tax shortfall of $X, government has to borrow 
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$(X + X1), where $X represents money that is borrowed 
and spent, while the $X1 is money that is simply 
borrowed, period.  
 
Consolidating the debt. 
When government subsequently decides to consolidate 
the debt after let us say Y years, government will, all 
else equal, just need to reverse the above process: that 
is, it will need to raise taxes by enough to buy back $XY 
of bonds, plus it will need to implement quantitative 
easing (QE) to the tune of $X1Y. 
And this is where the big mistake comes by those who 
think that consolidating structural deficits or debt is 
deflationary. That is, in the case of debt for example, 
they think that the repayment of $XY of debt involves 
simply raising taxes and/or cutting public spending by 
$XY, and repaying creditors. And that certainly would be 
deflationary. In fact the latter mode of debt repayment is 
excessively deflationary and for no good reason: it is not 
a mirror image of the way in which the debt was incurred 
in the first place.  
No doubt some adherents to the conventional view 
would claim that implementing QE while repaying debt is 
some sort of cheat. One answer is that the above 
process of incurring debt and then repaying it simply 
returns the relevant economy and its money supply to 
where it would have been if the above debt had not 
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been incurred: that is, if the above extra government 
spending had been funded by increased tax right from 
the start.  
Indeed, it is ironic that what are sometimes called 
“economic conservatives” or the political right (who tend 
to oppose governments running up large debts) are the 
very ones likely to object to paying off debt in the above 
manner, because debt repayment is “assisted” by 
printing money to the tune of $X1Y. 
To repeat, the latter process simply returns the economy 
to where it would have been had structural debt never 
been incurred! Thus much of the West’s elite, economic 
conservatives in particular, are in the bizarre position of 
objecting to the very thing they want: the scenario that 
would obtain if no structural debt had been incurred. 
 
Debt derived from stimulus. 
In contrast to structural debt, there is debt incurred as a 
result of Keynsian stimulus: having government borrow 
and spend. 
The conventional wisdom is that this Keynsian policy 
makes some sort of sense. However, it can well be 
argued that borrowing for stimulus purposes makes no 
sense at all. In particular, it is hard to see the point of 
government borrowing money and paying interest for the 
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privilege when it can print as much money as it wants at 
no cost. 
Keynes (1933), Friedman (1948: 250), Mosler (2010) 
and Hillinger (2010:3) pointed out that deficits can 
perfectly well accumulate as extra monetary base rather 
than extra debt. Of course having deficits accumulate as 
monetary base rather than debt is doubtless more 
stimulatory, dollar for dollar, than accumulation in the 
form of debt. But that just means that fewer dollars need 
be employed for given stimulatory effect under the 
“base” option than the debt option. 
If incurring debt for stimulus purposes does indeed 
make little sense, it follows that if a government has 
accumulated debt for stimulus purposes, it should be 
possible to convert this debt to monetary base without 
any austerity. And indeed, this is easily done simply by 
“printing” or creating monetary base and buying back 
debt (or ceasing to roll it over). In short, debt can be 
converted to monetary base via QE. 
That on its own would probably be too stimulatory 
because PSNFA becomes more liquid. And that in turn 
would necessitate some form of compensatory and 
deflationary measure, like increased taxes.  
As long as the stimulatory effect of the QE equals the 
deflationary effect of the extra tax (and/or public 
spending cuts), the net effect is neutral. That is, there is 
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no effect on GDP, aggregate employment and so on: in 
short, no austerity. 
Apart from the above PSNFA effect, there are of course 
additional ways in which the Keynsian “borrow and 
spend” policy might work. For example, Keynsian 
borrow and spend involves taking cash from the 
relatively well off, and spending it in ways that channel 
money into the pockets of the population at large. Given 
that the less well-off spend a larger portion of additional 
income than the rich, there may well be an aggregate 
demand expanding effect. 
However, the effects of Keynsian policy is much in 
dispute, plus quantifying the effect is not central to the 
argument here. The central point made here is that 
whatever the effect of Keynsian policy and the debt it 
gives rise to, the debt can be paid off without any 
“recovery hindering” effects. 
To illustrate, if Keynsian type stimulus has an effect way 
beyond the PSNFA  effect, that just means that 
consolidation will have a relatively deflationary effect, 
which in turn means that the tax increase accompanying 
the above mentioned QE would have to be relatively 
small.  
To summarise so far, structural deficits and debts can 
be removed without any big deflationary effects. 
Stimulus debt is equally easy to remove. In contrast 
stimulus deficits clearly must stay in place as long as the 
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recession continues. However, the latter can perfectly 
well accumulate as extra monetary base rather than as 
extra debt. 
 
The combined structural and stimulus debt. 
As most readers will have noticed, consolidating 
structural debt can be done in the same way as 
consolidating stimulus debt (extra tax or less public 
spending plus QE).  Thus there is no real need to know 
how much of a country’s debt has accumulated for 
structural rather than stimulus reasons. To repeat, the 
two were separated above just to clarify the theory. 
Furthermore, the actual stimulus obtained from 
increasing stimulus debt years ago has nothing to do 
with how stimulatory or “unstimulatory” the consolidation 
of such debt this year or next ought to be. For example, 
if the private sector is currently in a fit of irrational 
exuberance, that would be an argument for 
consolidating debt in a relatively deflationary manner. 
Indeed, to ignore both the size of the current debt and 
monetary base and the circumstances in which they 
arose is very much in keeping with Lerner (1983: 39), 
who said "government fiscal policy, its spending and 
taxing . . and its issue of new money . . . shall all be 
undertaken with an eye only to the results . . . and not to 
any established traditional doctrine about what is sound 
or unsound".  
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Incidentally, if taken to the extreme, the above QE 
policy, would involve buying back all debt which would 
result in a “zero debt” economy. And that is not as 
outlandish an idea as it might seem: Friedman 
(1948:250) and Mosler (2010) advocated zero debt 
economies. 
 
Open economies. 
As far as incurring and paying off debt goes, the basic 
difference between a closed and open economy is of 
course that foreigners can respectively buy and sell 
debt. 
The word “foreigner” is not strictly accurate here in that 
as far as economic effects go, there is no difference 
between on the one hand a foreigner selling debt and 
reinvesting the proceeds abroad, and on the other hand, 
a native doing likewise. In other words it is the behaviour 
of those prepared to invest abroad rather than in just 
one country that is of relevance here. However, the word 
“foreigner” will be used below for the sake of brevity. 
If foreigners sell debt during a debt consolidation phase 
and reinvest the proceeds abroad, the price of the 
currency of the country concerned falls relative to other 
currencies, that is devaluation takes place. And this of 
course involves a standard of living reduction for the 
country concerned, which certainly counts as “austerity”. 
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But there are several reasons for thinking the amount of 
austerity here will be or could be limited. 
1. No austerity for the world as a whole is involved since 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the best 
assumption that can be made is that the standard of 
living loss for the devaluing country will be matched by a 
standard of living rise for other countries.  
2. Where foreigners hold a significant portion of a 
country’s debt, there is a limit to how quickly they can 
withdraw their investment without causing a serious 
devaluation of the currency of the debtor country, which 
in turn devalues the worth of the rest of foreigners’ 
investment in the country concerned. For example, 
China has been seriously concerned about the 
monetisation or threatened monetisation of US debt 
recently. But China has withdrawn very little of its 
investment in the US because of this. China, so to 
speak, has nowhere else to go. 
3. As mentioned above, any austerity caused by the 
behaviour of foreigners can only occur via devaluation. If 
a significant number of countries coordinate their 
consolidation efforts, the foreign exchange effects are 
ameliorated, thus any austerity is also ameliorated. 
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Aggregate employment.  
Some advocates of the idea that debt consolidation 
hinders the recovery presumably mean “recovery” in the 
sense of returning aggregate employment to pre-
recession levels, rather than returning GDP growth to 
pre-recession levels.  In fact there is little reason for 
consolidation to reduce aggregate demand and thus 
aggregate employment. 
The only reason for such a reduction comes from the 
fact that debt consolidation changes the pattern of 
demand, which in turn requires people to change jobs, 
re-train and so on. And that would temporarily worsen 
the inflation / unemployment relationship. (The altered 
pattern of demand stems, amongst other reasons, from 
the devaluation of the currency of the debt repaying 
country, mentioned above.) 
But this altered pattern of demand occurs just as much 
during the build-up of debt as during consolidation, 
which is yet another reason for governments not to incur 
debt! (Yet more arguments against governments 
incurring debt are given in Musgrave (2010)). 
The solution to this altered pattern of demand problem is 
to consolidate debt slowly rather than quickly. If the 
resulting altered pattern of demand is small compared to 
the constantly changing patterns of demand that occur 
anyway, then the effect on aggregate employment will 
be small. 
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Is consolidation urgent or necessary? 
Having argued that consolidation can be effected with 
little or no austerity, this is not to suggest that 
consolidation is urgent for every country.  
Several governments are currently paying a rate of 
interest on their debt which, after adjusting for inflation, 
is around zero or even negative. Moreover the national 
debts of the US and UK at the time of writing are still 
only around half the level, relative to GDP, that obtained 
just after World War II. 
Having said that, there is a particular sense in which 
debt reduction can be taken too far, which is as follows. 
As pointed out above, there is little point in a country 
which issues its own currency borrowing money, given 
that it can print any amount of such money as required. 
Thus reducing the stock of “interest paying” debt makes 
sense.  
However, monetary base is at least nominally a debt 
(owed by the central bank to holders of monetary base). 
It is debatable as to whether this counts as debt, but if it 
does, then reducing this form of debt can go too far: if 
such a reduction were to reduce PSNFA to such an 
extent that the private sector did not spend enough to 
bring full employment, that would constitute “going too 
far”. 
15 
 
 
Conclusion. 
1. To the extent that an economy is closed, debt 
consolidation need not hinder the recovery or cause 
austerity. There may well be political problems relating 
to which income or social groups gain and lose from 
debt repayment, but overall, no austerity need be 
involved. 
2. To the extent that an economy is open, debt 
repayment involves austerity for the country concerned 
only to the extent that debt holders invest the proceeds 
of debt repayment abroad. Even where proceeds are 
invested abroad, no austerity for the world as a whole is 
involved, since loses by debt repaying countries are 
matched by gains in countries which do not repay debt. 
3. Austerity can be minimised in debt repaying countries 
if those countries coordinating their debt repayment 
efforts. 
4. As distinct from austerity in the sense of hindering 
GDP growth, debt consolidation would reduce aggregate 
employment because the pattern of demand is altered. 
But this problem can be minimised by limiting the speed 
of consolidation.  
 
_________ 
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